Talking of the 'legacy' of an instimtion, as it is pronounced in the title of this volume with regard tO the International Crimi...r1 al Tribunal for the Former Yugo slavia (I CTY), evokes the question of whether it was a success. The a._11.swer depends on what one expected. And this, in turn, depends on what goals international criminal justice� and Lhe ICTY in particular, has been designed to achieve.
Process and Rights: Three �ews will not be considered goals for their own sake but merely as procedural modes to other substantive ends, such as providing justice by ascenaining the truth, 6 those goals are not presented in detail. Instead, fairness or expediency appear to be the main yardstick, or the most important criteria, for evaluating the proceedings. also the ascertainment �f truth which the ICfY is supposed to pursue. 14 In addition to these 'classical' procedural maxims of fairness, expediency, and ascer tainment of truth, even the aims of restorative justice find expression in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence {RPE), by requiring the ICIT to take care of the restitu-. f 15 d . . . 16 tlon o property an to promote compensauon ro v1ctuns.
As both the truth-related and the restorative provisions in the judge-made RPE have no explicit basis in the ICIT Statute, the question is where they might obtain their authority from. A partial answer can be found in Resolutions 808 and 827 (1993) of the United Nations Security Council, by which the ICTY was estab lished, and which can be undersrood as a quasi-preamble to its Statute. l7 The same holds for Resolution 9 55 {1994) in the case of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).
In principle, both tribunals are tasked with a multi-faceted mandate. 18 Led by the common aim of prosecuting the most serious violations of international humanitarian law, they are suppos ed to:
{a) put an end to impunity for such crimes; (b) bring persons responsible for them to justice and, by doing so, (c) contribute to the restoration and maintenance of peace, and (d) !=nsure that such violations are halted and (e) effectivel y redressed.
There is one remarkable diff erence to be observed, though: what had not been addressed in theiCTYResolution, butlaterwas proclaimed in theiCTRResolution, is (f) the conviction that the prosecution of those crimes would contribute to the process of national reconciliarion.19 14 Astonishingly even more clearly than in Schrag's list, rhis aim finds express ion in requiring Lhe witness solemnly 'to speak the uuth, the whole trurh and nothing but the auth' (rules 90(A), 91(A)), as well as in expecting the Trial Chamber to make the interro ga tion of wimesses and the presentation of evidence effective 'for the ascenainment of the truth' (rule 90(F)(i)). Although not ex p licitl y mention ing search for truth, the j udges' right at any stage to put any question to the wimess (rule 85(B)) as wdl as their right to permit enquiry inro additional matters (rule 90(H)(iii)) and to order a party to produce additional evidence or prop rio motu to summ on wimess es and order their attendance (rule 98) This tenden cy towards modifying, or even transcending, the original mission for which the internationaf mbunals l:i:ave been established can also be obserV"ea--i n other semi-official pronouncements, such as the expectations which, as stated by a former judge, have been recognized by the ICTY: beyond contributing to the maintenance of peace and to reconciliation, the court is expected also to give victims a voice and to compile a complete historical record of the war. 22 That the IC1Y is not the only institution to see its rniss_ ion exJ:ended beyond the original Resolutions is also ill ustrated by the ICC: while the Preamble of the Rome Statute, as already noted, did not proclaim more than that the international crimes concerned must not go unpunished and impunity for the perpetrators should be reversed,23 the Assembly of Stares Parties in its 'Strategic Plan of the lnrernarional Criminal Coun' of2006 described the 'mission' of the ICC in broader terms: after first stating that the ICC has 'fairly, effectively and impartiall y' to investigate, 20 In fact, it is not even so easy to bring the objectives of the ICTY Resolution and the Schrag list of goals together: while putting an end to impunity (a) clearly corres p onds to (5), bringing suspects to justice (b) resembles (1) and (2), and international reconciliation (f) seems to be address ed in (7) and (15), it is not quite clear whether effective redress (e) has to be understood in terms of restitution and reP.arations (18) and whether ensuring the halt of crimes (d) is covered in Sch.rag prosecute, and conduct trials, and to act 'transparently and efficiently', we read that it shall also contribute '(a) to long lasting respect for and the enforcement of international criminal justice, ({3) to the prevention of crime and (y) to the fight
. , 24 against Impuruty .
Coordinating aims, means, an.d modes
What may be learned from these findings with regard to the procedural evaluation of international criminal justice? Two questions need particular attention.
First, if the long list of goals which the ICTY-and in a similar -way other international criminal courts-are expected to fulfil is contrasted with the rather sparse pronouncements oh the mission of rhese institutions in official documents, the question is whether t.. he long list should not be reduced ro the goals that are quasi-officiall y proclaimed, or whether a less formal and more open policy should be preferred. Although the minimalist approach may please jurists of historical inter p retation, and would more likel y protect the justice system from becoming overstrained, I think the alternative is, at least in principle, the right one. Even at the national level it is not unusual to find the reasons for establishing a new institution left our of official documents; and even if aims are formally pronounced in a--preamble, this is not necessarily a complete and definite description of the institution's mission. Still more important is the rational interest in construin g an institution so as to make the best out of it. Therefore, unless ex p licitly excluded, institutions of international criminal justice should have the right, and even the dury, to p ursue any aim within their basic mission of combatting serious interna tional crimes, both by doing justice in res p ect of the past and by contributing to security and peace in view of the future.
international criminal justice; and two, between the macro level of the criminal justice system as a whole, including its aims and objectives, and the micro level of the individual proceeding in which parti cul ar goals are to be achievecl 26 As it is funhermore true that the goals of criminal justice may have varied weight within the different stages of the proceedings, differentiated approaches to various proce dural features are required. 2 7
Though I agree with these basic distinctions, as they allow us to bring long lists of scattered goals into a certain order, I think that a further step must be taken, by distinguishing between aims, means, and modes of international criminal justice.
Whereas aims are the ends international criminal courts are established for, means
are the measures and instruments by which these goals are to be reached, and modes are the ways in which it is to be done. If I may ill ustrate this distinction by an example used be fore, bringing suspecrs of international crimes to justice is the aim, which is to be achieved by means of ascertaining the truth, and is to be performed in a fair and efficient manner.
What does this mean for the co-ordination of the numerous goals supposed to be pursued by international criminal justice in the various lists mentioned before and which, in fact, are still t:O be complemented with the g oals normall y pursued by national criminal justice? Without sortin g out yet at this point what finall y may not be relevant for evaluating the procedural system ofinternational criminal justice, it is not difficult to recognize that certain g oals may be appropriate for being aspired to at the macro level ofinternational criminal justice as an institution, whereas others have to be pursued on the micro level of the individual proceeding. As will be seen when taking a closer look at the various goals, however, what may be a direcr aim of the individual trial, such as to pUnish an acc iised who has been found guilty, -is an "aim that can at the same time be a means of enforcing international law and paving the way for the reconciliation and lasting peace which the international tribunal is established for. }Jthou g h, of course, not every case will have the capac_i ty to make a p ositive contribution to the ultimate obj ective of international criminal justice, the individual proceedings-should at least avoid detracting from that objective. - According to these relationships between ultimate ends of international criminal justice and the direct aims of the individual proceedings and their means and modes, the miscellaneous goals pronounced in various proclamations and in the listin g s mentioned before can be coordinated in the following way.
First, in regard to the goals, the ultimate ends of establishing a system of international criminal justice, independently from or complementary to the do mestic judicial system, must be (A) the restoration and maimenance of peace, based (B) on the re-establishment of the rule of law, (C) the enforcement of international 26 As to my own expectations in these respects, cf Albin Eser, 'The law, and (D) national reconciliation. This pro cess can be enhanced (E) by employ ing the law and procedure of international tribunals as models fo r rebuilding the domestic legal sys tem devastated by war crimes and human rights violations.
In order to render possible these (and an y similar) ultimate objectives of interna tional criminal justice, the individual proceedings must be aimed at bringing a sense of justice to crime-rorn people and places by (F) putting an end to impunity fo r such crimes, (G) bringing persons responsible fo r them to justice, with the further aim (H) of deterring fi.uther crimes. This contribution to the restoration of peace and reconcil iation will be more efficient the greater (I) is the satisfaction fo und by the victims.
No less important fo r maintaining a lasting peace will certainly be G) the creation of a reliable historical record of what causes led to the crimes and who was responsible fo r them, (K) thus to fo restall future denial of those events and responsibilities. Such far -reaching goals ma y appear doubtful, and therefore we must return to them; yet what already at this point can be stated is the expectation that international criminal proceedings shall at least not o b struct th e finding and recording of historical truth. The same applies to expecting international criminal justice (L) to provide public education in general and (M) to develop the applica tion of international law and norms?8 "While the aims considered so far are peculiar to international criminal justice, the purposes of punishment at the micro level of individual proceedings are common both to national and international prosecutions. In the same way, however, as most national courrs would rarely explicitly and comprehensively pronounce on the purposes punishment in a given case shall serve, international courts as well are rather taciturn in this respect. Therefore it is mainly left to the judiciary-and thus finall y to the judges-what purposes to take into consideration and what weight to give them in sentencing. So it cannot come as a surprise that the traditional goals of criminal justice govern the practice of senrencing:29 though with varied weight, purposes of punishment are seen in (N) retribution and (0) reconfirmation by the law, (P) deterrence both. of the perpetrator and the public at large, (Q) rehabilita tion of the offender, and,-ro a cerrain degree, {R) sati-sfaction fo r the -vi ctim.-?0 Secondly, in view of this long and manifold list of substantive aims of interna tional criminal justice, the question is by what procedural means they may be accomplished. To state this as briefly as possible, as this requirement must be considered later in more detail: almost all of the aims of international criminal justice described above require (S) the search fo r the truth. No peace without justice, no justice without truth: if this commonplace is true, as I think it is, not 28 As it is named in Schrag' s list of goals (14) and ( 16), but not mentioned by others. As already remarked here, although good performance of international criminal justice will ho p efully exert such positive side dfects, the courtS may be overburdened when formally mandated to such far-reaching ends. 29 As revealed in an analysis of the case-law of the ICTY by Swarr (supra note 25) 105 ff. 30 As to my own concept of punishment in w.PJ ch I t ry to inte g rate various purposes in a certain order rather than simply adding them, see Albin Eser, 'A Vision of a "Humane" Criminal Justice. only the traditional function of criminal justice to convict the guilty and to exonerate the innocent but also the satisfaction of the victim by officially recogniz ing the harm done to him or her and to provide ade q uate reparation presupposes the ascertainment of the truth. Satisfaction of the victim, seen also as a step towards reconciliation, can also be supported (T) by giving the victim a voice.
Thirdly, regarding the modes in which the p rocedural means and measures fo r achieving these substantive aims of international criminal justice should be em ployed, certainly the most important-and often named-p rinciples are those of (U) fa irness, (V) efficiency, and, as an essential element of it, (W) the expediency of the proceedings . Further maxims occasionally mentioned in strate g ic plans or lists of goals are (X) impartiality, (Y) transp arency, and (Z) public scrutiny.
Finally, when viewing these aims, means, and modes of international criminal justice together, it is obvious that their weight is different, and even that they may conflict with each other. This can happen, in particular, when the search fo r the truth would impair fairness or if reconciliation could be expected only by leaving certain events not fully investigated.
It seems that it will not be possible here to elaborate on all fa cets and tensions between the various aims and maxims of internatio nal criminal justice. What I wish to fo cus on, though, is the extent to which the procedural structure and fea tures of the ICIY are devised and constructed in the best possible way to fulfil the mission of this judicial institution, and, to the extent that this is not the case, the improve ments that would be re q uired. Among the man y challenges that deserve attention, only these can be addressed here: the need to adj ust the basic structure of the procedure to the aims of international criminal justice (section 3, below) ! improve ments to the search fo r the truth (section 4), ade q uate guarantees of fai rness (section 5) and expediency of the proceedings (section 6), improved paths to reconciliation (section 7), and efforts to record historical findings (section 8).
3. To he adjusted to the aims : the basic structure of the procedure If the Achilles' heel of international criminal justice is in the procedural law, 3 1 the structure and maxims of that law are of fundamental significance. Although I think this is no less true with regard to the substantive requirements of criminal respon sibility, I learnt from my experience as a j udge that the outcome of a case can be quite different depending on the procedural model that is employed-in contrast to my original theoretical assumption, generated by long-standing com p arative research, that criminal cases, as different as the procedures may be, if based on the same substantive law will finall y come to the same result. 32 if, instead of the basically parry -driven procedure as it is practised at these tribunals (see subsequently) , a more judge-led approach were fo llowed. Cf also Schomburg (supra note 6) 108 . . In other words, irrespective of the particular advantages and disadvantages the adversarial model entails, 42 as a matter of principle it was like a birth defect in the development of t.. �e ICTY procedure that, beyond the intrinsic procedural goal of bringing the case to an end, paid no due attention to the more far-reaching aims of international criminal justice. This is not to ignore the fact that quite a number of substantive goals listed above from (A) to (R) have their proper place on the macro level in terms of the existence of an international criminal tribunal as such; this applies in particular to the re-establishment of the rule of law and the enforcement of international law. Even achievementS on the macro level, however, can hardly be expected if the procedures on the micro level of individual prosecu tions are not shaped in a way that would give the pursuit of these aims a real chance.
So, even if not every individual trial can be expected to render victim satisfaction or contribute to the restoration of peace, the pursuit of such aims should be kept alive by the procedure or, at least, not obstructed by it. This is what is meant when we consider the adj ustment of the procedural structure to the aims of national criminal justice. And this is likely to be missed if a new procedure is shaped on a traditional domestic model, conceding modifications only here and there, instead of developing the procedure fr om the outset in view of the aims and means required fo r the special mission of international criminal justice.
This a�lies, of course, to all procedural models. Therefore, as is increasingly admitted, the degree to which the present ICfY procedure is more adversarial or more inquisitorial is indeed irrelevant. What finally matters is the availability of a procedure by which the aims of international criminal justice are achievable in the best possible way. This, however, can hardly be achieved in the course of an almost chauvinistic competition of preferring one's own national model over others. The motto and mechanism fo r future attem p ts must therefore be: instead of developing a procedure from a particular domestic model and merely adj usting it in response to certain international needs, and in this way remaining within the 41 Though the unmistakable missionary ambition with which the adversarial model is worldwide offered as the best p ossible system of criminal procedure is as not been welcomed without scepticism in all coun tries concerned; fo r references cf Eser (supra note 26) 208. 42 As shall be shown subsequently in more detail.
tight perspective of a national corset, it would be necessary, first, to identify the aims that international criminal justice must pursue, and then to construct the procedure in view of these aims, hopefully thus making them achievable, or, at least, not obstructing them. Now, since this was not the way in which the I crY procedure was constructed, the question is in what respects the present law and practice s uffers fr o m consider able deficiencies and how they could be corrected. As this can not be performed here in more than an illustrative manner, the fo cus shall be on aims, means, and modes which, in my view, are the most crucial ones. These are, as already indicated, the search fo r the truth, fa irness and expedien cy , reconciliation, and the question of the historical record. 4 . To be improved: the search fo r the truth
Truth as means to further ends-inherent limitations
Contrary to what is perhaps a widespread belief, the search fo r the truth is nm: an ultimate end of international criminal justice per se, bur rather a means fo r renderin g j ustice, reconfirming the rule of law, or contributing to reconciliation and the restoration of peace. Even where victims cry our for the truth, their final aim is satisfaction, or, less conciliatorily, retribution. 44 Nevertheless even as mere means to other ends, the search for the truth as a 'corners tone of the rule of law'45 is a key element of criminal justice, both national and international. This is obvious with regard to the main aim of rendering justice, commonly considered not to be attainable witho ut truth. What justice, however? Is it in terms of retribution, as stated in some judgments of the ICIT?46 Or, less retributionally, is it in terms of re-establishing the rule of law by bringin g grave violations of humanitarian law as international crimes to the public light and not leaving them unpunished? Howsoever these and similar aspects of renderin g justice may be weighted and ranked, neither an accurate verdict nor a truly j ust punish ment can be rendered without having searched fo r the truth.
B ut perl?-aps even more important is the view to the future. In principle, I think, and except fo r certain conflicts among goals later to be addressed, the key role of truth is not contested by any serious contemporary procedure, neither by the inquisitorial nor by the adversarial model.47 There are certain differences between both, however, at least to some degree. Whereas, as I have mentioned, the search fo r the truth is considered to be the hallmark of the inquisitorial model, the adversarial model is supposedly more fa irness-oriented.48
Due to its adversarial matrix, it will come as no surp rise that the ICITs procedure is less keen about the search fo r the truth than civil-law procedures would be.49
This is not to say, however, that absolute truth has to be produced at any price. Rather, there are quite a few impediments, three of which are to be mentioned here, by which the searching fo r and the finding of the truth are hindered irrespective of the underlying procedural model.
The first one is a corollary of human nature. Courts established and operated b y human beings-and not by an omniscient God-will realistically never reach more than 'procedural truth '.50 Not being able to find absolute truth, however, can not excuse us from striving fo r the best possible truth. Despite all the scepticism, truth and justice are 'intimately intertwined' to such a degree that a judgment can be accepted as 'j ust' onl y if it is at least based on an honest effort to find the truth.51
While recognizing these qualifications, ascertainment of the truth still remains a precondition of--equally genuine and literally true-j ustice.
The second kind of impediment to the search fo r the truth is more legal in character and an achievement of modern humanitarian law. Human dignity and the right to life and physical integrity, as well as other human rights, are barriers to the search fo r the truth, irrespective of the underlying procedural model. 52 This is a point at which the principle of fai rness also comes into play. A third impediment to the search fo r the truth may result fr om tensions with other aims of international criminal justice, and in p articular with that of reconcili-
anon.
Apart from these reservations, the search fo r the truth is an indispensable requirement of criminal justice. In a civil proceeding, directed as it is towards a mere balancing of interests, it may be appropriate to leave it to the parties to decide what evidence of truth they might present to, or withhold from, the judge. This, however, can hardly be the maxim of criminal proceedin g s desi g ned to ascertain the guilt or innocence of a perso n and the damage done to victims.
This finally leaves us with impairments to truth that are attributable to the kind of procedure used, and thus may be co nditioned by the underlying modeL Three procedural fe atures ill ustrate this point: the role of the participants involved, in particUlar that of the jud g es; witness proofing; and plea bargaining.
·The role of the parties and the bench in the search fo r the truth
Leavin g aside fo r a moment whether this fact is indeed presupposed by its Statute, the ICIT, in practice at any rate, proceeds basicall y alon g adversarial lines.
.As
'party-driven' rather than 'j udge-led', 56 this system implies that, on the one hand, it is at least in p rinciple left to the parties to decide what evidence to present, what witnesses and exhib its to introduce, and in what manner and sequence to perform the examination. On the other hand, the judges should refrain from intervening, because of seein g themselves primarily as arbiters or referees, holdin g the 'scales of justice evenly' between the parties.57
__ _
What does it mean fo r the search fo r the truth to leave the proceedin g s in this way largely in the hands of the parties? 5 8 As supporters of the party-driven model like to ar gu e, the chance of ascertainin g the truth will be greater if fo ught fo r by two adversaries both determined to win their own case. 59 However, this will lead to the full truth only if both sides are will ing and able to perform their job properly, neither by neglecting relevant evidence nor by intentionally wi thh olding it fr om the notice of the judges-as may be the case where both parties, fo r different reasons, are concerned that a wimess might make statements detrimental to their case. If in such a situation party incapacity or obstructionism cannot be counteracted by the judge, truth will fal l by the wayside.
Perhaps bein g aware of such adversarial shortcomin g s, the drafters of the ICIT will ingness to make use of these judicial powers is the adversarial understanding of the proceeding as being the 'parties' case', the success or failure of which is a res p onsibility of the parties. 63 This attitude of judges in the adversarial tradition to consider the case before them to be not theirs but the parties' case is perhaps the most crucial point with regard to truth in criminal justice. As this stance must be changed if the principle of 'no justice without truth' is to be taken seriously, some general remarks on the role of judges in international criminal justice appear appropriate.
Without wanting to question the virtue of'judicial restraint' in principle, there is a fundamental difference between the indictment, with its various counts, and the evidence of the facts upon which the charge is based. The charge (including the alleged crimes and the fa cts supposedly underlying them) is one thing-it is the function of the prosecution. The ju_dgment on the charges and facts is another thing-it is the function of the court. If a judge in reaching his or her verdict is restrained by the parties because they are withholding from the judge certain evidence relevant fo r proving the truth, he or she is expected to make a decision on a basis which is not real but prefabricated by the parties . This curtailment of judicial decision-making is fundamentally different fr om limitations and investiga tive gaps that result from legal exclusionary rules: limitations of that sort, required by the rule of law (Rechtsstaatlichkeit), must not be transgressed, not even fo r the sake of the truth. The question we are considering is different, however, if, beyond the limits required by the rule oflaw, the court in ascertaining the truth is limited to evidence produced by parties with one-sided incriminating or exonerating interests. Without having the chance to get the full picture of all legally obtainable evidence fr ee of self-serving stratagems of the parties, the judge is literally 'de�raded' to a decisional instrument, dependent on the parties fo r evidentiary input. 4 court comes close to a kind of ' moot court' that has to decide on a quasi-hypotheti cal constellation of fa cts based on a presentation of evidence staged by the parties.
Whether these concerns are not as weighty when raised in relation to parry dominated proceedin g s on the domestic level is not a question to be explored here.
At the level of international criminal justice, two peculiar fe atures require attention.
One is in re g ard to the fa ct that, in contrast with adversarial jury procedures in domestic systems, international criminal courts are composed of (professional) jud g es . In domestic jury systems the jurors are the only ones to function as 'fact finders' in relation to the charges, while the j ud g e's role is consequently limited to presidin g at the trial, stating the law, serving as a mediator between the parties, and (as practised in certain jurisdictions) deciding the sentence. In international Trial
Chambers, as at the IC1Y and the ICC, the professional judges are not only responsible · fo r keeping the trial in procedural order (principally through the presiding judge) , but also for decidin g on rhe facts, the application of the law, and the sentence. 65
Another reason fo r nor allowing judges in international criminal justice to delegate the responsibility fo r ascertaining the truth to the parties is the comprehensive mandate of the co urt as a whole. The. proposition that a bench of judges should be limited to a mere fo rmal control of the proceedings, leaving the outcome of the case to the ability and discretion of the parties, is difficult to reconcile with the extraordi nary responsibility resulting from the decision-making power over most serious international crimes. As the power and duty to prosecute international crimes are conferred upon the IC1Y itself, 66 and not solely upon the parties, judges must blame not only the parties but themselves as well, if, due to an insufficient ascertain��!l! of the truth, a defendant is wrongly fo und guilty or erroneously acquitted. This plea fo r a pro-active role fo r the bench in ascertaining the truth could be realized without delay if, as a first step, the judges at international criminal courts were rriore will ing to make use of the procedural rights they already have:67 to question wimesses if the examination or cross-examination remains unclear on certain facts, or to ask fo r production of additional evidence if, fo r instance, available witnesses to relevant facts have not been call ed by the parties, and so on.
Still more important, however, would be a second step: the upgrading of the current interventional o p tion available to the bench into a judicial duty to ascertain the truth. This would mean a change to the present system, which leaves to the discretion of the judges when and to what degree to make use of their right to further question witnesses and their power to ask fo r additional evidence. This 65 On these essential differences between a jury trial and a proceeding tried by professional judges see also Safferling (supra note 47) 371. This difference has also been underlined by the then ICIT President Antonio Cassese in his Statement of 11 February 1994 (supra note 38) when arguing fo r the best p ossible free judicial evaluation of evidence: 'There will be no jury sitting at the Tribunal, needin g to be shielded from irrelevances or given guidance as to the weight of the evidence they have heard. We, as judges, will be solely res p onsible fo r wei g hing the probative value of the evidence before us' (at 65 1). given by witness es even before they have been asked the question, pre-empting the question put to a previous witness by a j udge and thus to be expected a gai n.
On the other hand, when afterwards cross-examined by the opposite party, a witness may be do minated by adverse feelings hindering him from fr eely and fully answerin g questions p otentially detrimental to the original party's 'own' case. But even worse, if he turned over to the other side, thus somehow 'betraying' his original party, it would not be easy to challenge his credibility, since the rules on so-called 'hostile witnesses' all ow the impeachment of a witness only under cenain restrictions. 7 8 In the fa ce of these impediments to a complete establishment of the truth, I was not at all happy to find the adversarial tradition of witness proofing practised at 75 As phrased (and frequently referred to) in a submission of the I would like to understand its second p art to mean not more bargaining than necessa ry .
To be guaranteed: fai rness

Fairness and expediency
Though the search fo r the truth is the most important instrument fo r accomplish ing various substantive aims of international criminal justice, it must not be p ursued at any price. Thus a price not to be paid for truth is fairness of the proceedings. For though truth is a prere q uisite of justice, the search fo r the truth may fail to achieve sustainable justice if carried out with unfair means. The same is true, to a certain degree, of expediency: if the ascertainment of the truth com p letely disregarded the expectation of finalizing a proceeding within a reasonable time, the chances of rendering satisfaction and establishing reconciliation would v an ish.
96 Despite Dama.Ska's highlighting of practical needs (supra note 90), he is, in fact, fo llowing the same line when finally discussing the deficits or merits of plea bargaining with regard to pedagogical goals of international justice, reconciliation of groups, or transparency of proceedings (at 1037 ff).
97 See infra section 7.
98 See supra at section 4.2, furthermore Schomburg (supra note 6) 110. On the other hand, fai rness and expediency are merely the modes in which the p roceedings are conducted and not their true aims. Trials are not performed for the sake of p roviding a public platform fo r the judicial demonstration of fairness and expeditiousness. If performed fo r other substantive aims, though, the trial must be performed in a fai r and expedient manner. Therefore, it would be wrong to misconceive the adversarial emphasis on fairness as a procedural goal as being in opposition to the inquisitorial search fo r the truth. Instead of understanding the relationship between the two as 'one versus the other', they must be appreciated fo r their combined effect, in which the ascertainment of the truth-as the basis of a truly just judgment and procedural instrument fo r achieving the substantive aims of criminal justice-is the goal which must be p ursued in a fai r manner. 101 In this sense, fair ness is no less important as a guarantee of the rule of law than truth.
Unlike truth , which is less prominently indicated in the procedural instruments of the ICTY, fairness is more often and explicitly pronounced as a requirement of the proceedings in international criminal justice. It might be said that one of the advantages offered by the adversarial principle in ensuring equality of arms is to be fo und in the protection of the parties from unfair disparities in time and amount of evidence led when presenting their case at trial. This is a common challenge in international criminal cases, where the number of prosecution witnesses generally exceeds the number of defence witnesses. 119 Al though the easiest way to ensure equality of arms might be to allow the parties the same time and amount of evidence, particularly in relation to the number of witnesses and documents, this could easil y go against another principle of proce- . .
_Impartiality of the judges
A second fe ature by which the adversarial setting appears superior to other proce dural structures is the impartiality of the judges. As one more important 'compo nent of the right to a fai r trial'-repeatedly described so by the Appeals Chamber of the ad hoc tribunals 1 2 2 and recopized in their statutes 123-it has generated a remarkable amount of case law. 12
As to its structural significance, it will not be, at firs t glance, surprising that a judge who is limiting herself to quietl y fo llowing the proceedings, and intervenes only if an objection of a party has to be decided, is not runn ing much of a risk of having her impartiality contested, compared with a judge who ex p oses himself by asking questions or admoniShing witnesses to speak the truth. 125
. On second thoughts, however, it is not so clear that a silent judge is necessarily unbiased and an intervening judge obviously partial. As a matter of fa ct, it all depends on the personality and consciousness of a j udge. If a judge possesses an impartial sense of duty, as he or she solemnly promised to fulfil when taking office, 126 his or her questioning of a witness will be determined by a neutral pursuit of truth, irrespective of whether the answer satisfies or displeases one or the other of the panies. On the other hand, if a judge is biased, he or she may fa vour one parry to the detriment of the other by remaining silent or by not intervening where fa irness requires it.
If there remains one fe ature by which the adversarial self-restrained judge will seem superior, it could be public appearance: even if he is in fact not unbiased, he may seem so, and thus give less ground fo r requesting his recusal. But there again the question is about what should be preferred: appearance or reality?127
There is another point, however, that I am much more worried about when considering the role of judges: it is the broad power and discretio n of the president to assign judges to certain Chambers or even to specific cases, as it is practised in the administration of international criminal justice. 12 8 This is not to ignore the fa ct that the comparatively small number of international proceedings and their fre quently excessive length require a high degree of flexibility that could hardly be managed by strict assignment rules ·a:s are provided for-eg in guaranteeing the so call ed 'statutory judge'-in certain countries. 1 2 9 Nevertheless, should not the discretion of the president of the court in composing the Chambers, and accord ingly the discretion of the presiding judge to assign members of his Chamber to specific cases, at least be exercised according to certain pre-determined criteria and guidelines? Otherwise, the administration of international criminal justice is open ing a flank to political chall enge of its impartiality or its lack of sensitivity, as fo r instance where a judge is assigned to a case which p artly overlaps with another case in which he or she has adopted a certain position.130 126 Cf rule 14 1CfY RPE. 127 This is, of course, not to exclude that even the mere a pp earance of bias can constitute a ground fo r recusal as it had been invoked, but was finall y denied by the ICTR Bureau, in Prosecutor v Seromba, Case No ICTR-200 1 -66-T, Decision on Motion fo r Disqualification of Judges, 25 April 2006. What is rather questioned here is the difference between the ostensible appearance of impartiality as likely to be assumed of a silent judge and the assumption of bias of an active judge who in reality is impanial. 128 As ar the ICTY according to rules 19, 27 (C) and 62(A) of its RPE. In defence of this practice cf Theodor Meron, 'J udicial Independence and Impartiality in International Criminal Tribunals ' (2005) 99 American ] of lntl Law 359, 363 £
Self-representation of the defendant
Regarding fairness, there are still other fe atures by which the adversarial procedure is not necessarily superior to other models, and might even be wo rse. An extraordi narily topical example of this is self-representation by the defendant. 131 Whereas the adversarial tradition leaves him, in principle, only the choice of being assisted by counsel or opting fo r self-representation, 132 excluding any other fo rm of assistance except perhaps that of'standby counsel' or amicus curiae, 133 other procedural systems see no problem in all owing both self-representation and assistance by counsel at the same time.1 34 Possibly except fo r the special g roblem of mandatory assignment of a counsel against the wishes of the defendant, 35 in princi p le the scope of fair ness is certainly broader if the defendant, instead of being limited to the 'either/or' of self representation or assistance by counsel, is allowed a cumulative 'as well as '. 136 5. 136 Not least would the latter way also be in better accordance with the international guarantees of the defendant's right to 'defend himself in person or thro ugh legal assistance', as it is, eg, phrased in Art 21(4)(d) ICIY Statu te; fo r instead of interpreting the 'or' in exclusive terms of 'either-or' as it is wrongly done by disregarding that there is no 'either' prefixed in the phrase, it is in favour of a right of freedom of choice much more persuasive to understand the 'or' in terms of all owing self-representation and assistance of counsel beside each other, at least if the defendant so wishes, cf Es er (supra note 134) 174. In principle support of this cumulative approach see also Judge Schomburg in his Fundamentally Dissenting Opinion, in Prosecutor v Krajifnik, Case No IT-00-39-A, Appeals Chamber Decision on Momcilo Krajisnik's Request fo r Self-Representation, 11 May 2007, para 83.
procedure, but that a variety of ways is available. Though this was mainly illustrated by exposing flaws in the predominantly adversarial character of international criminal justice as currently practised, it is not to be understood as a principal rej ection of this model. The point, rather, is that, despite the widesr.read mistrust among common law practitioners of any inquisitorial elements, 3 7 in certain respects fairness can be even better served in non-adversarial ways . Here we must also acknowledge that in many so-called civil law jurisdictions, as a result of fundamental procedural reforms affecting all but the judges' duty to ascertain the truth ex offi cio, there is not much left of the infamous fo rms of 'inquisition' .138 Even if there remain national differences with regard to the scope and degree to which the rights of the accused are recognized, to my knowledge one will nowadays be hard pressed to find a European continental jurisdiction in which these rights are substantially less secure than in an adversarial system.
Thus it seems to be less the ensuring of fa irness that would re nder one of the competing models superior to the other. All the more crucial, then, to scrutinize the achievement of other goals of international criminal justice now.
To be enhanced: expedien cy
Length of the proceedings--causes
Expediency, just as fairness, is another 'mode' in which the proceedings are to be performed. Even though they are occasionall y dealt with together, 139 one must be aware that fa irness and expediency, rather than necessaril y aiming at the same end,
. fli The question to be considered here will be a pragmatic one: can the present procedure ensure expeditiousness while respectin g the other goals of international criminal justice? This is all the more important given the amount of complaints 137 As to the persistence of such prej udices, thou g h perha p s not herself sharing them, cf Fairlie (su.fra note 48) 247. 38 As in particular with regard to the far-reachin g reforms of the Features not to be underestimated as possible causes of expansive iadictments and lengthy trials are in particular the fo llowing. First, the more the prosecution fears that, should a coum: fail or evidence turn our to be insufficient, mo difYing an indictment or bringing additional evid�nce is precluded, the more the prosecution will be inclined to fr ame the indictment as broadly and comprehensively as possible and to present as many witnesses and exhibits as are available . Conversely, the defence will fe el impelled to counteract with a correspondingly long list of witnesses and documents. 149
Secondly, although these dynamics of expansion might be brought under control by a stringent relevance regime, the filtering out of irrelevant evidence will succeed only if the Chamber, as early as practicable, takes c6ntrol of what evidence to admit as relevant, or, at least, gives the parties guidance as to what it deems to be relevant; and, to be sure, this should cover relevance of both legal and fa ctual matters.150 Otherwise, even well-intentioned prosecution and defence counsel will feel obliged to define the relevance of evidence as broadl y as possible to avoid the risk of not presenting evidence which might have been considered relevant in the eyes of the judges.
Thirdl y , an uncertainty capable of inducing the broadest possible presentation of evidence may also result fr om unresolved differences in the conception of substan- tive law. Although so far scarcely discussed, this is a particularly crucial point fo r procedural systems which are primarily party-driven and not judge-led. In a primarily judge-led trial, the bench is, as a rule, from the very beginning supposed to be fam iliar with the elements of the substantive law to be applied to the charges, and, if there are uncenainties in the inter p retation of the law, to make up its mind with regard to the requirements fo r coming to a verdict of guilty or not guilty; accordingly, the presiding judge will be in a position to direct the presentation of evidence to the fa cts which might finally become relevant fo r the verdict, thereby avoiding time-consuming presentations of legall y irrelevant circumstances. If dif fe rences in the concepti on of the substantive law to be applied to the charges occur in a trial primarily driven by the parties, they will, as a rule, not be in a position to fo resee which alternative interpretation of the law the judge ma y finally fo llow. If in such a case the prosecution in its pre-trial briefinterprets an element of the crime in broader terms than the defence is willing to accede to in its brief, 151 and if the Chamber reserves its understanding of the law to be applied until its final judg ment, or if it refrains fr om even disclosing a prior indication as to what line of interpretation it will ultimately fo llow, then the parties, if they do not want to take risks, have no choice but to suppon their interpretation of the law with what they believe to be relevant evidence. 1 52
Fourthly, the aforementioned fac tors-leading to lengthy proceedings are exacer bated by the separation of the trial into a p rosecution and defence case. 153 If, as is typical of international rrials, the indictment contains a large number of different counts, each covering numerous events, the presentation of evidence with regard to the same count and event by the prosecution on the one side and the defence on the other may be separated by months or years. 1 54 In these situations, it is all the more difficult to keep the presentation or exclusio n of evidence wi th regard to its relevance under control.
Fifthly, the disadvantages of such distinctly se p arate trial phases become even more evident when, after the conclusion of the defence's case, a 'rebuttal' is call ed for by the prosecution, which might be fo llowed by a 'rejoinder' by the defence. For the purpose and scope of these pre-trial briefs of the parties cf rule 65ter ICIY RPE. 152 If, f or instance, the Defence in its p re-trial brief contends that a superior-subordinate relation ship in terms of Art 7(3) ICTY Statute requires the existence of cenain ranks and the bearin g of certain insignia, while the prosecution considers both to be irrelevant, then the parties, as lon g as they do not know which interpretation the Trial Chamber will fo llow, will be forced to p resent evidence either (as the prosecution) to prove that ranks and insignia exis ted (althou g h that is, in the prosecution's own view, wrongl y required by the defence) or to prove (as the defence) that the fighters in question were not or g anize d by ranks or insignia (as is, in the defence's own view, wrongly considered irrelevant by the p rosecution) . If the Trial Chamber in such a situation indicated as early as possible to the parties wh ether or not it considered ranks and insi g nia material to establishing a superior-subordinate relationship, a lot of irrelevant evidence could be avoided and time saved. concerned. On the other hand, a rigid rebuttal practice can twn out to be even more counterproductive. If, fo r example, the prosecution must take into account that, due to a very strict and narrow rebuttal regime, the later introduction of evidence will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, it will already at the pre-trial stage reson to precautions which may increase the number of proposed wimesses and exhibits and thus lengthen the trial. 15 6 Funher, the less judges are inclined to allow substitution of evidence that turns out to be weak, either during or befo re the end of the trial, the more a party will, in order to be on the safe side, fe el compelled at the pre-trial stage to seek to have an overabundance of evidence admitted.
Sixthly, it is necessary to attend to the vagueness or lack of clarity from which indictments suffer. It is bad enough that justice may fail wh ere clearly proven facts cannot be subsumed under the indictment because it was fixed on one alternative of the criin inal provision, missing another one which could have been fulfilled, or because the facts of the charge are described in such a way th�t they cann ot be subsumed under alternative elements of criminal responsibility. In addition, if such ambiguities in the indictment are not clarified in the pre-trial stage, 1 5 7 they ma ; not later be cured by a 'j udicial warning' (as is possible in some jurisdictions); 15 and thus a lot of time can be wasted on the presentation of useless evidence. Funher more, this does not only concern the trial, but the appellate stage as well. For the more the indictment is tainted by deficiencies, the greater the risk that the Appeals Chamber will have to deal with submissions concerning the correct interpretation or even invalidity of the indictment. Seventhly, although at first glance it might appear as if the prosecution is primarily to blame fo r flaws in the indictment and presentation of excessive evidence, such an impression would be only partly true. For in a similar way that the prosecution fe els compelled as a precautionary measure to offer more evidence than necessary to convince the Chamber of a certain incriminating fact, the defence, also being unaware of what the Chamber will find relevant or is possibly already convinced of, will, in order not to be fo reclosed later on in rejoinder, from the very beginning-present an-overly abundam-witness and-exhibit list. T-his may perhaps even include evidence with respect to non-indicted issues, aimed more at public image considerations. Even an indictment flawed by vagueness or lack of clarity can be viewed as useful, and thus left unchallenged by the defence, in order to be later invoked as grounds fo r error at the appeal stage.
When looking fo r the roots of the aforementioned flaws in expediency, two characteristic fea tures of the adversarial system come to mind: first, the proceeding is party-driven rather than judge-led, with the consequence that the length of the trial substantiall y depends on what each party considers to be relevant fo r its case; and secondly, the division of the proceedings into 'prosecution case' and 'defence case'. 156 As to diffi culties which may arise fo r the Trial Chamber due to a too narrowl y minded rebuttal Process and Righ ts: Th ree V7ews
The adversarial trial typicall y starts with the prosecution presenting its charges and eviden�e, fo llowed-after a possible 'intermediate acquittal' by the coun on counts lacking evidence capable of supporting a conviction 159-by the defence presenting its discharging evidence. This adversarial setting of consecutive prosecution and defence cases is even further prolonged by the fac t that each phase begins with the examination in-chiefby the call ing party, followed by cross-examination by the opposing party, and is potentially continued with re-examination by the original party.
It is no surprise that this adversarial setting can produce undesirable side effects. The inherent antagonism which exists in the adversarial setting of opposing panies leads to a corresponding differentiation between 'prosecution witnesses' and ' defence wit nesses' .16° Furthermore, the criminal proceeding from the very beginning is cons idered a battle which each side desperately wants to win. Consequently, in order to guarantee an 'equality of arms' in this struggl e, the various prosecution and defence stages into which the trial is divided are supponed by ' combat rules' regarding the manner in which the chief-, cross-, re-, and any funher examinations may be performed. Even in a simple murder case, it may be difficult to avo id time-consuming repetition where evidence on the same elements is being presented in fragments. The situation is exacerbated in typicall y com p lex international criminal proceedings, where one side has to present its evidence long before the other side. Without being able to fo resee what the later counter-evidence may be, a party could fe el forced to come forward with evidence covering as broad a scope as possible. Thus, as well-meant as this network of rules is fo r guaranteeing 'equality of arms', it certainly lengthens the proceedings.
This complexity is made worse by certain examination rules, in particular those regarding 'leading questions' which in the chief-, cross-, or re-examination may be differently admissible fo r the defence and-mostly not-for the prosecution, as well as the rules regarding so-called 'hostile witnesses ' .161 Not only are these and . il ul diffi ul 162 th 1 h "al 163 s1m ar r es c t to master, ey are prone to pro ong t e tr1 . In view of these findings, �en committed supponers of the adversarial tradition meanwhile concede that this procedural system, however well-suited it may be to domestic proceedings, is not--or at least not withom significant modifications apposite fo r the complex challenges of international-criminal justice. by distinguishing between the macro level of the international criminal justice system as a wh ole and the micro level of the individual proceeding, 178 I have no doubt that an eno.(Ill ous contribution to opening the do ors fo r reconciliation and peace has already been made by the establishment of a functioning international justice system-as a signal that impuni ty fo r grievous international crimes will no longer be tolerated and as a reinforcement of the rule of law as a precondition of peace. To render more than general contentment, however, and to achieve the individual satisfaction particularly of the victims concerned, the individual proceed ings must be p erformed in a manner appropriate to furthering reconciliation. This is not to say that any and every trial could be expected to render the victim satisfaction and to contribute to the restoration of social peace. But even if this realisticall y is not the primary objective, 179 reconciliation should at least not be obstructed by the way in whiCh the proceedings are performed. In this respect, the current procedure has some fe atures which appear more to impair than facilitate reconciliation.
This already applies to the characterization of the procedure as 'adversarial'.
Although this merely seems to imply terminology, it is sending out a message that is not without influence on the procedural atmosphere. 'Adversarial' has an inimical connotation of hostility, detrimental to reconciliation. This effect co uld be avo ided if the procedural structure of international criminal justice were underswod as 'contradictorial' rather than 'adversarial'. 180 As 'contradictorial' merely exp resses the mode of elucidating the truth by way of contradiction, including confrontation, the actors of a criminal proceeding could be understood as parmers in a (contro versial) dialogue: at best 'in a spirit of co-operation'.
181
In this conceptio n, the prosecution would understand its role not as a one-sided 'adversary', determined to win by any means, and therefore primarily looking fo r incriminating facts and evidence. Instead it would consider itself as an 'office' (in the sense of the Roman duty-bound offi cium) which, though in a contradictorial manner, must search both fo r incriminating and exonerating fa ctors.182 Further more, d owngrading the 'adversariality' of the proceedings by treating witnesses as 'witnesses of the court', instead of 'prosecution witnesses' or 'defence witnesses', would more easily avoid projecting the national/ethnical conflict behind the criminal events in the fo rmer Yugoslavia into the courtroom, fr om where discrimi natory lessons may even be fo rtified in the mind of mistrustful home commu nities . 183 If witnesses, instead of being attached to one or the other adversary, and accordingly labelled, could be presented as being neutral 'court witnesses' in search of the truth, 184 this might also be a contribution to promoting reconciliation.
As fo r the manner in which the examination of wi tnesses is performed, 185 if they are, according to adversarial tradition, limited to answering questions put to them in a telegraphic manner with 'yes', 'no', or 'I don't know', and are interrupted whenever they attempt to add a sentence which might elucidate matters further but may be disadvantageous to the questioner, they must surely fe el instrumentalized, as obj ects to be kept under control rather than treated and trusted as responsible human subj ects. This is particularly counter-productive to reconciliation when a wimess was hoping fo r relief by being given the chance to tell all that he knows about the criminal event in a coherent manner-and after having done so being prepared to make peace with the past.
With reconciliation as an aim, should plea bargaining be used by the international criminal courts?186 On the one hand, plea bargaining could function as a door-opener fo r reconciliation if it is connected with a remorseful guilty plea which the victims are also satisfied with. 187 In such a case, even the search fo r the troth must give way, perhaps in terms of a conflict-solving type of proceeding. 188 On the orher hand, if plea bargaining results in a deal that the victims are not satisfied with, particularly after not having been heard at all, both the exploration of the truth and a genuine and sustainable reconciliation will have been missed. Without wanting to ignore the fact that the involvement of victims in criminal trials can entail side-effects which may be detrimental to the interests of the defendant and to the expediency of the proceed ings,189 if reconciliation is to be taken seriousl y , it will not function without the victims being given an opponunity to have their case heard. 190 183 Cf Bonomy (supra note 22) 350; Mirko Klarin, 'The Petri g (supra note 90) 22 f, Sluiter (supra note 3) 5 98.
To he recorded: historical findings
Like reconciliation, recording of historical findings is an essential prerequisite of sustainable peace, and thus also an important aim of international criminal jus tice. 191 If reconciliation between communities strained by historical-culcural ten sions is to last and not be affected by new and untruthful legends, then ascertaining the truth to the best extent possible is not only essential to rendering justice in the individual case, but also to illuminating the basis of controversial historical events .
192
Yet, also like reconciliation, recording of historical findings can hardly be more than a by-product of criminal proceedings. Judges are not trained historians nor are court transcripts and exhibits historical documents. Nevertheless, even if wi mess testimonies ·or other evidentiary material is incomplete193 or biased, after having been contested and verified in court and fo und reliable as the basis of a judgment, such findings will certainly have a higher degree of truthfulness than any untested statements or hearsay reports that self-proclaimed history books are often based upon. l9 4
Thus, although international crirni�al tribunals, if the y are not to lose their very character as a judicial body, are primarily tasked with performing a trial on the guilt or innocence of accused individuals,195 the judges, rather than preventing the explora tion and documentation of historical facts, should be open to recording them as material fo r historio g raphy. 19 6 In this respect, an international tribunal's obligation to establish the truth certainly goes well beyond that of an ordinary domestic court.
Concluding remarks
If these lessons from the ICTY seem quite critical, it does not mean that the procedure and practice of the tribunal should be considered a fai lure. Nor may the listin g of deficiencies mainly attributable to the still predominantly adversarial ICfY sy stem be understoo d as a call to replace ir with some kind of inquisitorial procedure.
On the contr ary , one of the messages hopefully emanating fr om these procedural observations is the proposition that international criminal justice cannot be organized by simply adopting and then adj usting a domestic model, be it adversarial or otherwise. What is necessary, first, is to identifY the special aims international . criminal j usti ce is being established for, and, secondly, to develop procedural means and modes best suited to achieving those goals. Thus, ins tead of choosing a model of do mestic criminal justice of this or that provenience and trying here and there to make it fit to the special needs of international criminal justice, one should, without feeling bound to a certain traditional system, be keen enough to construct a procedure to p -down, from the aims international criminal justice has to pursue.
Without wantin g to ignore the disappointments and hurdles international criminal tribunals still have to live with, their deficiencies are certainly outweighed by their merits, in particular by their sheer existence and ability to put an end to impunity of most serious international crimes. This is no reason, however, not to fight fo r further procedural improvements.
With this in mind, I would like to repeat what I have already stated on other occasions: if an international criminal court fails, history will not care whether it was due to rules and structures which left it up to the parties to decide what to present or to withhold. In the judgment of history, it will be the court as a whole with its judges at the fo refront-that will be held accountable fo r the fai lure or success of international criminal justice.
